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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
PETITIONERS

The Petitioners are the City of Cuyahoga Falls, its
Mayor, Don L. Robart, its former City Engineer, Gerald
Dzurilla, and its former Clerk of Council, Gregg Wagner.
Petitioners were the defendants in the District Court and
appellees/cross-appellants in the Court of Appeals. Since
this case was filed in 1996, both Gerald Dzurilla and
Gregg Wagner have left their positions with the City. The
individual defendants remain in this litigation in their
official capacities only.
RESPONDENTS

The Respondents are Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation, a not-for-profit corporation that seeks to
construct housing utilizing housing tax credits; Buckeye
Community Three, L.P., a limited partnership that owns
and operates the housing development in question; Cuyahoga Housing Partners, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation
acting as the general partner of Buckeye Community
Three, L.P., (referred to collectively as "Buckeye,"); and,
the Fair Housing Contact Service, a not-for-profit fair
housing advocacy organization. Respondents were plaintiffs in the District Court and appellant/cross-appellees in
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners are unaware of any
publicly held companies owning 10% or more of the stock
of any of the respondent entities.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Buckeye is a real estate developer that specializes in
developing affordable housing. Transcript of Preliminary
Injunction Hearing (hereinafter, "Tr.") 11; Docket Entry
Record (hereinafter, "R.") 70, 71, 72. Buckeye relies on
housing tax credits to develop affordable housing. It
finances its developments with such tax credits, local,
federal, and state grants, financing from private financial
institutions, and its own development fund. Tr. 12. Buckeye must offer rents at or below a level affordable for
people with incomes no greater than 60% of the area's
median income (adjusted for family size) to obtain the tax
credits. Tr. 13. Buckeye's developments, including the
Pleasant Meadows development at issue here, provide
housing for people with mid-level incomes, such as teachers, librarians, and police officers. U.S. Supreme Court
Joint Appendix (hereinafter, "App.") 142.
The tax credit program is subject to strict deadlines,
which make such developments especially vulnerable to
delay. Sixth Circuit Joint Appendix (hereinafter, "JA") 30204. A development must be placed into service, i.e., receive
a certificate of occupancy from the local building authority,
by the end of the second year following the tax credit
award. Tr. 13.
In 1995, Buckeye located a suitable parcel of land on
Pleasant Meadows Boulevard in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, a
city that is 99% Caucasian. This parcel was zoned to allow
17 units per acre. JA 148; Tr. 202-27. The Pleasant Meadows development was planned as a 72-unit complex
(approximately 11 units per acre), with 16 two-bedroom,
and 56 three-bedroom units. Tr. 29-30. The planned
development of the land was well within the maximum
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density permitted by the zoning. App. 136. Before purchasing the land, Buckeye's President, Steve Boone, sent a
letter to Cuyahoga Falls Mayor Don Robart informing him
of Buckeye's intention to buy the Pleasant Meadows
parcel. JA 1382. Several days later Robart assured Boone
that Buckeye would have "no problem" with the tax credit
development. JA 1380-82. In reliance on that assurance,
Buckeye then purchased the Pleasant Meadows land for
approximately $300,000. Tr. 20-21. Buckeye paid a premium for the land because of the zoning classification
allowing up to 17 units per acre. JA 724, 728-30. In addition to the tax credits, Buckeye secured construction
financing from National City Bank in the amount of
$3,195,000.
City officials knew that delay would be catastrophic
for Buckeye. App. 157, 763; JA 943. If the housing tax
credit program deadlines are missed, the developer loses
the tax credits that are the basis of the development's
financing, and the development becomes financially
impossible to construct. Tr. 14. In addition, the developer
is precluded from competing for grants to support other
tax credits developments. Tr. 50-51. Because tax credits for
Pleasant Meadows were approved in 1995, it was imperative that the development be ready for occupancy by
December of 1997. Tr. 13. Moreover, if Buckeye did not
close the National City Bank loan by December 15, 1996,
it would lose the construction financing and would have to
find alternate financing, which, according to Boone, would
have been "pretty much impossible." Tr. 27.
Buckeye encountered extraordinary opposition at
every stage of its development of Pleasant Meadows. In
the fall of 1995, Buckeye started working with the City's
Planning Department to secure approval of the site plan
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for the Pleasant Meadows development. Tr. 31. The Planning Department imposed excessive requirements for a
development of this kind. Tr. 32, 4 7. For example, as a
condition to proceeding with construction, Buckeye was
obligated to build, at an estimated cost of $70,000, an
eleven-foot high "barrier" wall or "buffer" between its
property and adjoining condominiums. Tr. 4 7; JA 152-54,
966-67.
A Planning Commission meeting was scheduled for
February 21, 1996 to consider approval of the site plan for
Pleasant Meadows. Prior to that meeting, both Planning
Director Sharpe and Mayor Robart met with neighborhood
groups who expressed opposition to the development,
based in part on the number of children expected to live
there. Tr. 135-37; 271-74. Councilman Potts solicited
opposition to the development by sending a notice to ward
constituents urging them to attend the February 21
meeting to "express [their] concerns." JA484-88.
On February 21, the Planning Department submitted
Buckeye's site plan to the Planning Commission for
approval. App. 35-52. The City's law expressly limits the
scope of the inquiry that may be made by the Planning
Commission in approving the site plan. 1 However, public
officials and residents voiced opposition throughout the
meeting, based on issues outside the permissible scope for
evaluating a site plan. App. 37-49. Steve Boone described
the February 21 meeting as "walking into a hornets' nest."
Tr. 34. He was asked to answer questions "that had absolutely nothing to do with the allowable factors for site plan
approval," such as, "Are your little kids going to shut up
' Cuyahoga Falls Ordinance 1144.04 (July, 22, 1974).
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right at sunset?" Tr. 36; App. 44. Because there was no
legal basis to reject the development, the Planning Commission reluctantly approved the site plan on February 21,
1996. App. 50; Tr. 150-57.
Site plan approval for a development of this type in
Cuyahoga Falls required ratification by the City Council of
the Planning Commission's approval. Tr. 128. A Council
meeting was scheduled for March 4, 1996. At the meeting
Mayor Robart spoke out vehemently against approving the
Pleasant Meadows site plan, echoing the "mood of the
community." R. 40, Ex. D, p. 50. He suggested delaying the
Council vote to buy time. R. 40, Ex. D, p. 150. At this
meeting, the City's Law Director first mentioned a referendum, which was then taken up by citizens in April. App.
173-7 4. The vote to approve the site plan was tabled at
Robart's request to March 18. Tr. 40.
At the March 18 meeting, Robart noted that Buckeye
had important "deadlines" and urged Council to exploit
those deadlines by rejecting the site plan and "go to court."
Robart held this view despite advice from the City's Law
Department that if the City were sued, it would probably
lose. App. 157, 119. Councilman Rubino told the gathered
citizens how he had looked for any possible legal reason to
oppose the site plan and that he could find none. He and
Councilwoman White admitted to "trudging around in
about seven inches of mud" in a vain effort to find wetlands as a "legal shred" to halt development. App. 150.
City Council's vote was again delayed to get a written
opinion from the Law Department as to whether there was
any legal basis for the City to reject the development. Tr.
43. On March 29, 1996, the Law Department responded
that the City must base its decision solely upon the zoning
code. R. 40, Ex. G.
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After the March 18 meeting, Boone was approached
by Councilman Schmidt with a request that Buckeye
change the location of the development away from the
Pleasant Meadows location. Tr. 45. Boone met with three
members of City Council as well as a planning official to
view the proposed alternate site which was located on an
active landfill. Because tax credits are awarded on a sitespecific basis, Buckeye was unable to move the site of the
development. Tr. 45-46.
Council eventually approved the site plan on April 1,
1996. Tr. 43; JA 935. Buckeye immediately applied for
building permits. Tr. 95. When the ordinance to approve
the site plan was presented to the Building Department,
however, the Mayor directed Service Director Barbara
Sculley not to issue Buckeye any permits until further
notice. R. 34, Ex. A. City Engineer Dzurilla, who was also
Chief Building Official and Planning Examiner, stopped
work upon receipt of a Law Department memorandum
instructing him to hold any permits "in abeyance." R. 34,
Ex. A. Several days later Dzurilla received an unprecedented order from Sculley that he was not to issue building permits for the Pleasant Meadows development
without her approval. Tr. 193-94.
Citizens began organizing a referendum drive after
several meetings with the Mayor and Planning Director.
Tr. 271-79. Mayor Robart had input regarding the name of
the petition campaign, and spoke out in favor of the drive
at a citizens' meeting on April 9. R. 40, Ex. D, pp. 84-88; JA
903, 1174. While various comments were made at this
meeting about the children who would live in Pleasant
Meadows, those who would circulate the petitions were
warned not to make any discriminatory comments. Tr.
295.
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A referendum petition was filed with the Clerk of
Council, Gregg Wagner, on April 29, 1996. Tr. 196. It was
then sent to the Summit County Board of Elections for
signature validation. On or about May 1, 1996, the petition was returned to the City from the Board of Elections
indicating that the signatures were valid. R. 68. The City
accepted the filing despite a Law Department memorandum explaining that the City's site plan review was
limited to those matters within the zoning code. JA 816-17.
A vote on the referendum was held in November, 1996, but
the vote was not certified pursuant to a ruling by District
Court Judge Bell. R. 68.
P. Gilbertson Barno, Executive Director of Buckeye,
wrote a letter to the Engineering Department on June 20,
1996, demanding that the building permits for Pleasant
Meadows issue. App. 110. On June 26, Dzurilla, on advice
of the Law Department, sent a letter to Buckeye informing
them that the building permits would not issue due to the
referendum. JA 907.
Buckeye did not receive building permits until approximately three years after its initial application. As a
consequence of this delay, Buckeye was shut out of tax
credit developments for a period of approximately three
years because the failure to meet time deadlines precludes
a developer from applying for grants to support other tax
credit funding. Tr. 50-51; R. 193-94. Because Buckeye
named the funding entities that controlled the financing of
Pleasant Meadows as nominal defendants in this lawsuit
and was able to reach a settlement whereby they changed
Ohio's tax credit allocation plan, Pleasant Meadows was
constructed in 2000 at substantially increased cost, despite the City's efforts to kill it. However, as a result of the
years of delay, Buckeye's ability to construct other housing
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was severely impaired and Buckeye and its principals
were brought to the brink of bankruptcy. JA 1220-24, 1269.
Estimates of damages were produced to the City and in
court in 1999 and were in the millions. R. 193-94.
Respondent Fair Housing Contact Service introduced
uncontroverted statistical evidence that if Buckeye's
development were not built, families with children and
Mrican-Americans would be disproportionately harmed.
Tr. 202-27.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following the filing of the referendum petition, this
case proceeded on two tracks: a declaratory judgment
action originally filed in the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas and a separate federal action for damages
and injunctive relief filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. On May 1, 1996,
Buckeye filed a declaratory judgment action to have the
referendum that sought to reverse Buckeye's site plan
approval declared unconstitutional under Ohio law. The
Ohio Court of Common Pleas denied declaratory relief and
the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme
Court also affirmed, but reconsidered its decision and
ultimately declared the referendum unlawful under the
Ohio constitution on July 16, 1998. JA 56-58.
Buckeye filed the federal action on July 5, 1996,
seeking injunctive relief and damages under both the Fair
Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. Buckeye
sought a preliminary injunction to stop the referendum
from rescinding their site plan approval, and a preliminary injunction hearing was held before District Court
Judge Sam Bell on November 19-21, 1996. The City filed a
motion for summary judgment on October 15, 1996. Judge
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Bell denied the preliminary injunction on December 13,
1996, and Judge Bell also denied the City's motion for
summary judgment on June 20, 1997 in a comprehensive
published decision. 2 The case was set for trial in August
1998. Buckeye moved for partial summary judgment as to
liability with respect to the due process claim on April 2,
1998. The City moved for summary judgment on all claims
on June 5, 1998. Prior to ruling on the motions and prior
to trial, Judge Bell retired. District Court Judge Dan
Polster was assigned the case on September 8, 1998. Judge
Polster granted the City's summary judgment motion and
denied Buckeye's motion on November 19, 1999. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari p. 35a.
Buckeye appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed Judge
Polster's decision on August 31, 2001. 3 The City filed for
reconsideration en bane and was denied. The City then
filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on February 26,
2002, which was granted on June 24, 2002.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
[1] There is ample evidence to permit a reasonable
jury to find intentional discrimination on the basis of race
and familial status. This case is not about a single decision
of the City Engineer. Instead, it is about a concerted and
protracted scheme by City officials and residents to block

2 Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 970
F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
• Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 263
F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Buckeye's development, using excessive site plan requirements, delay, environmental excuses, Law Department
strategies, and finally a referendum, in their campaign to
kill Pleasant Meadows.
The record is replete with direct evidence that discrimination was the motivating force behind that campaign of resistance. Intent is also proven by circumstantial
evidence, as persons are presumed to intend the natural
and foreseeable consequences of their actions. There is
sufficient circumstantial evidence to merit a trial. Examples include an open search for pretext, the impact of the
challenged action on protected classes, the historical
context of the actions, the sequence of events leading up to
the challenged action, departures from normal practice in
procedure and substance, and the administrative history.
[2] The First Amendment does not prohibit the introduction of evidence to prove intent, even if that evidence is
speech or political activity. No referendum organizer or
voter was sued, and thus there was no chilling effect on
any political activity. The First Amendment does not
create a right for any person to discriminate in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause or the Fair Housing Act.
The City insists that a referendum proposed and
approved for invidious racial or family status reasons is
nonetheless valid under the Fourteenth Amendment as
long as the referendum is facially neutral. If that were
correct, it would legitimize a referendum rejecting construction of a synagogue or mosque, even where proponents openly campaigned on the basis of anti-Semitic or
anti-Muslim rhetoric.
[3] The Due Process Clause plays a fundamental role
in the land use context and protects landowners from
arbitrary and capricious actions by governmental entities
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which interfere with their legitimate expectations. Buckeye possessed a property interest based both upon its
ownership of the land and the full compliance of its site
plan.
Buckeye's property interest was infringed upon when
the City permitted a purely administrative question to be
submitted to a referendum vote. A governmental entity
violates substantive due process when it delegates administrative decisions to voters. Voters decided whether one
specific landowner, Buckeye, could be denied uniform
application of the law, although the law would remain
unchanged for all others.
The referendum at issue placed on the ballot the
purely factual and administrative question of whether a
site plan the voters had never seen complied with a zoning
code they had never read. The Planning Commission and
City Council had already determined that the site plan
unquestionably complied. Accordingly, no rational basis
exists for the question presented on the ballot.
The Charter's referendum provision did not provide
for citizens to waive restrictions to permit development.
Instead, the site plan referendum permitted voters to
decide in a standard-less, and hence, arbitrary and capricious manner, which violates substantive due process.
Finally, the evidence raises factual issues that the
challenged decision was due at least in part to an improper or illegal motive. The facts presented raise a valid
claim that the decision did not bear a substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and
is therefore an invalid exercise of the police power.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PERMIT A TRIER OF FACT TO FIND THE EXISTENCE OF A DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVE

This case is not about a single decision by the City
Engineer, but rather a concerted campaign on the part of
City officials and private citizens that continued over a
number of months to stop Pleasant Meadows, motivated
by race and familial status discrimination. It is undisputed that Pleasant Meadows would house a substantial
number of Mrican-American residents in a 99% white city.
Between the fall of 1995 and November of 1996, City
officials, in concert with a group of like-minded private
citizens, searched for ways to stop the development because the anticipated residents would be non-white families with large numbers of children. The participants used
a variety of tactics, culminating in a referendum, a tactic
ultimately held to be impermissible under state law. 4 The
question before this Court is whether this pattern of
behavior would support a judgment that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Fair Housing Act because it
was motivated by the race and/or familial status of the
prospective residents of Pleasant Meadows. 5
The District Court erroneously granted summary
judgment. The City agrees that it is liable if it were the
"moving force" behind the alleged discrimination. 6 There is
ample evidence that City officials indeed acted in concert
• Buckeye Community Hope Foundation u. City of Cuyahoga Falls,
82 Ohio St. 3d 539 (1998).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(k) and 3604.
• Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, p. 11.
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with private individuals to intentionally discriminate
against Buckeye and attempted to halt the multi-family
development because of the race and familial status of the
persons who were expected to reside there.
This Court's decisions from Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 7 to Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing establish the framework for finding
intentional discrimination. 8 The Arlington Heights test
requires only that a discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" for the action taken. 9 Unlike Arlington
Heights where the District Court and the Court of Appeals
upheld a decision after a trial using the clear error standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, the issue here is whether Buckeye has presented enough evidence to merit such a trial. 10

A

CITY OFFICIALS ACTED IN CONCERT
WITH PRIVATE CITIZENS TO USE A VARIETY OF TACTICS TO STOP THE DEVELOPMENT

The Pleasant Meadows development was first proposed to City officials in June of 1995. Over the next
eleven months City officials, in concert with residents,
created a series of impediments to block Buckeye's development. These obstacles included: imposing stringent site
plan requirements; delaying routine votes; searching to
7

Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

u.s. 252 (1977).

8 Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
9

10

Arlington Heights at 265-66.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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see if the land could be classified as a "wetland;" and
culminating in an illegal referendum. These facts are
stronger than those presented in Arlington Heights, which
was decided after the facts were developed in a bench trial.
In contrast, this case was decided on a motion for summary judgment where all inferences should have been
drawn in favor ofBuckeye. 11
The first roadblock was erected by the Planning
Department, which demanded the building of a $70,000
eleven-foot impenetrable wall to ghettoize and segregate
Pleasant Meadows residents from the surrounding community. The barrier wall was to be at least five feet of
bulldozed soil, topped with a six-foot "brick pilaster/cedar
batten board fence [to] run the full length of the property."
Tr. 47; App. 30-31. The Planning Department required
that the barrier be completed before building permits
could issue and before any other construction on the
development could begin. App. 30. Councilwoman Kathy
Hummel could not "recall any project where there [had
been such] scrutiny on a site plan, and ha[d] never seen a
requirement for a developer to put up a fence prior to ...
construction." App. 49 [emphasis added]. This substantive
departure from normal practice is strong evidence of
discrimination. 12
The requirement that a barrier be built between
Pleasant Meadows and the condominiums next door was
unique and sent an ominous signal that the City considered this development to be different and separate from
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986), and see, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
12 Arlington Heights at 267.
11
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any other. The barrier would be a constant visual reminder that the residents of Pleasant Meadows were
different from the residents of the adjoining condominiums. Buckeye acquiesced in the Planning Department's
insistence on this $70,000 barrier wall13 as well as to other
unusual requests, such as changing the name of the
development, 14 not because they were required by the
City's zoning code, but because of assurances received
from the City's Planning Department that such concessions would smooth the approval process. Tr. 47, 131.
Delay was the next strategy. Mter the Planning
Commission approved the site plan upon Buckeye's
acquiescence to its excessive demands, Mayor Robart
urged delay at the March 4, 1996 City Council meeting in
front of a number of residents (who later became
referendum leaders), stating that he would oppose
Pleasant Meadows "with vigor." JA 921-22. Knowing that
delay would derail the time sensitive tax credit financing,
Robart urged the Council to adjourn its vote on the site
plan for "two weeks, a month [or longer,]" "to stall the vote
[which] would have bought some time." JA 967; R. 40, Ex.
D, p. 50. Following the Mayor's lead, Council tabled the
13
The wall was not immediately constructed because, in the face of
the referendum campaign, Buckeye considered construction of the
estimated $70,000 barrier to be a futile gesture, at least until after the
referendum was decided. Tr. 48, 92. As this Court has noted, "litigants
are not required to make futile gestures." See, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 n.3 (1992).
14 The
City further requested that the original name of the
development - Cuyahoga Terrace - be changed because it sounded like
a public housing project. Tr. 129-30. Pleasant Meadows was not a
Section 8 project, nor was it public housing, but rather is a development
for tenants earning 60% ofthe median income in the area.
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hearing until March 18. App. 198. At the subsequent
March 18 meeting, despite Boone's request not to further
delay Buckeye's efforts to develop Pleasant Meadows, the
vote was again postponed to April 1. JA 935, 953.
Mter City Council's ratification of the site plan approval at its April 1 meeting, Robart pressed for further
delay by asking Service Director Sculley to instruct City
officials to not issue any building permits to Buckeye
"until further notice." R. 34, Exhibit A. Sculley complied
and sent City Engineer Dzurilla a May 1, 1996 memorandum. The directive was copied to the Mayor as his immediate supervisor, and it ordered that no building permits
were to issue for Pleasant Meadows without Sculley's prior
approval. Dzurilla had never seen a memorandum of this
nature for any other development. Tr. 193-94. 15
On April 30, prior to the referendum certification, the
Law Department further entangled itself by directing City
Engineer Dzurilla to hold "in abeyance" any work permits
until a determination was made regarding the efficacy of
the ordinance approving the site plan. R. 34, Exhibit A.
Such official interference in the permit process was unprecedented in Cuyahoga Falls. Tr. 191-94.
Furthering the delay, the City welcomed protracted
and expensive litigation, even though the City's legal
position was of questionable merit. Robart believed that
the City would be sued if the site plan was rejected, and
15 Buckeye received an April 26 letter from the Building Department requesting changes, many of which were not required under the
zoning code. Tr. 94-96. Buckeye responded in writing to the requested
changes on May 14, 1996, in part noting that the City had misquoted
its own zoning code. Id. at 96.
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that City officials could be sued in their individual capacities. Nevertheless, he urged Council to reject the site plan,
and "go to court ... let's see what happens," despite his
conclusion that, "we are probably going to lose." App. 157;
App. 119. 16 Robart noted that the City has an "in-house
law department" that "get[s] paid whether they are defending [a lawsuit by Buckeye] or if they are defending
another case." App. 156; JA 923. Robart "doubt[ed] Mr.
Boone has an on staff law department to file a lawsuit,"
and noted that Boone "has to spend dollars, then he has
got to make a decision as to how long does he want to
pursue this thing, given the fact that we all know that
somewhere along the line there is a deadline." App. 157.
Robart knew at the time he made these statements that
Pleasant Meadows was scheduled to be built in a properly
zoned area, and that the Planning Commission had
approved the site plan. Tr. 322.
Third, City officials attempted to contrive an environmental excuse to stop Pleasant Meadows. At the March
18 meeting, Councilwoman White explained that she
joined Councilman Rubino and City Clerk Wagner in
"trudging around in about seven inches of mud" to try and
establish the Pleasant Meadows' site as a wetland, "[j]ust
to get any legal shred that we could hang onto so that we
could reject this project." App. 150. Planning Director
Sharpe also was present, because Wagner had contacted
him about the wetlands stratagem. Tr. 140-42.
Fourth, the City Council asked the Law Department
for legal advice about how to stop Pleasant Meadows.
16
Robart based this assessment on advice he received from the
Law Department. App. 119-20; Tr. 314.
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Councilwoman Barbara White asked the City's Law
Department to issue a written opinion addressing: (1) how
to stop the Buckeye development and avoid municipal or
personal liability; (2) the extent of individual and Council
exposure to civil liability if they rejected the site plan; and
(3) whether a referendum could be used to challenge the
Council's own pending approval of the site plan. JA 974-75.
The Law Department opinion was clear - the only criterion the City could lawfully apply in reviewing the site
plan was whether the plan complied with the zoning code;
it declined to address the referendum question because the
Law Department did not represent individuals. JA 816-17.
Fifth, City officials worked with private citizens to
fashion the referendum strategy to prevent construction of
Pleasant Meadows. 17 Law Director Kennedy involved the
City in halting the proposed development when he planted
the seed for a referendum at the March 4 council meeting.
App. 173-74. Throughout the site plan approval process,
Mayor Robart worked behind the scenes to instigate a
referendum to stop Pleasant Meadows. Prior to Council's
approval, Robart met privately with residents to organize
the referendum drive. 18 Tr. 271-81; R. 40, Ex. G, pp. 84-85;
JA 903, 1174. Following Council approval, the Mayor
publicly supported the referendum to defeat the Pleasant
17
The City argued that it cannot be held responsible for the acts of
private citizens. Respondents contend that the campaign to stop
Pleasant Meadows was a public-private partnership, for which the City
is directly liable. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Furthermore, any actions taken under
color of a City's charter are actions of the City, whether taken by elected
or appointed officials or by its citizens through referendum.
18
Robart admitted he had input into the name selected for the
opposition group fighting the development. R. 40, Ex. D, p. 85; JA 1174.
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Meadows development at an April 9 meeting at North
Hampton Town Hall. 19 Tr. 279; R. 40, Ex. G, p. 50.
The next day, April 10, 1996, the Mayor involved the
Law Department in the referendum effort despite its
earlier memorandum disclaiming City residents as clients.
JA 816-17. Robart sought guidance regarding the number
of signatures required for a referendum. JA 979. Then, the
Mayor warned Steve Boone, "We are going to go for a
referendum." Tr. 92 [emphasis added]. The referendum
petition was filed with the Clerk of Council on April 29. Tr.
196.
Dzurilla continued to circulate Buckeye's plans to
other departments for comment as late as May 14, 1996.
Tr. 192. Dzurilla did not disclose to Buckeye any problems
with the site plan. Tr. 190-93. The failure to communicate
with a permit applicant [Buckeye] was a deviation from
the "normal process." JA 1049-51.
Louis Sharpe, City Planning Director since 1976, is
unaware of any other housing development built in Cuyahoga Falls for which a referendum was used to challenge
site plan approval. Tr. 139. Sharpe conceded that the
Pleasant Meadows site plan met all of the necessary
requirements of the zoning code. JA 721. Nonetheless,
Sharpe noted on Buckeye's building application that the
ordinance would not go into effect until May 1, 1996,
curiously adding, "unless otherwise changed by legal
action or referendum." Tr. 144.

Councilman George Potts testified that he believed Robart made
arrangements for the group to meet at the North Hampton Town Hall, a
City-owned building. R. 40, Ex. H, p. 53.
19

19
The referendum was simply the final component to
the delay strategy when all other ways to stop Buckeye
effects had waned. A trier of fact could reasonably find,
based on this evidence, that a partnership of public officials and private citizens campaigned to block the Pleasant Meadows development. 20

B. THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH EVIDENCE
OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The record contains substantial evidence from which a
jury could conclude that the City acted "because of" and
not merely "in spite of" the impact on racial minorities
and families with children. 21 Buckeye contends that the
City's animus toward protected groups was the motivating
force behind its campaign to stop Pleasant Meadows.
When public officials could not circumvent Ohio law
mandating issuance of building permits, they orchestrated
a public response in an effort to evade the requirements of
the Fair Housing Act.
Unlike many cases where intent is hidden, here there
are direct statements by public officials and referendum
leaders about their motives. 22 Steve Boone attended all
20 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (petitioner could
make out claim for violation of Equal Protection if she proved respondent refused her service at the suggestion of police officer in the
restaurant).
21 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979).
22 Compare, Arlington Heights at 268 and, Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (delegates "were not secretive about their
purpose" and the "zeal for white supremacy ran rampant"); and see,
Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982)
(statements of referendum proponents showed racial motives).
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three public meetings concerning the site plan and was
subjected to angry threats, intimidation and racist opposition. Tr. 36-39. One resident suggested throwing Mr.
Boone out a window; others followed him to his car. Tr. 37.
The vehemence of the public opposition is by itself strong
evidence that the emotional issue of race was present.
These meetings were crowded with residents who expressed angry opposition to the Pleasant Meadows development because of the likelihood of its occupancy by
families with children and Mrican-Americans. Tr. 34-44.
One resident stated, "We have got our ghetto. We have got
our low-income housing. This project is already being
called Pleasant Ghetto." App. 139. Another resident
objected, "when they get that boom box going it will be
loud." App. 144.
Residents mirrored the opposition expressed by public
officials. Lee Minier, a leader of the referendum drive,
stated that, "They know what kind of element is going to
move in there [referring to Buckeye's development], just
like you have on Prange Drive," the only place in Cuyahoga Falls that has a substantial number of MricanAmerican residents. Tr. 182-85, 270, 316.
At a recorded City Council meeting on March 4, 1996,
Mayor Robart commented about an article in the local
paper titled, "Stuck in the Ghetto," and "problems associated with [subsidized housing]." App. 189. He agreed with
State Representative Wayne Jones' statement, "The
problem is condensing these individuals in one place like
Prange Drive. It just breeds problems. I think it is a
legitimate concern." JA 917-20 [emphasis added]. He
further inflamed passions by raising the specter of forced
busing. JA 965-66. The Mayor spoke of "problems [associated with] subsidized housing." JA 965-66. Robart stated,
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"we have done our part off of Graham road in Cuyahoga
Falls," which Robart admitted was meant as a reference to
Prange Drive. Tr. 315.
Families with children were openly disparaged. For
example, Planning Director Sharpe said, "the sensitive
nature of the fact that this project would be a larger family
type project" was the basis for the Building Department's
insistence upon the eleven-foot high barrier. App. 98.
Councilman Potts objected to the approval of the site plan
because of the different lifestyles of an adjoining "retirement" condominium and the proposed Pleasant Meadows
development "that would potentially have a lot of children." JA 479; App. 37. Mayor Robart expressed sympathy
with residents' objections to the expected influx of large
families with children. Tr. 274.
Council members openly searched for a pretextual
reason to block Pleasant Meadows. Sandy Rubino, Councilman at large for the City, made the following speech at
the March 18 Council meeting:
I am going to be very honest with you folks ... I
have been wrestling with this issue for two
weeks and I have not gotten a lot of sleep . . . I
have looked under every rock in [sic] your behalf,
and other members of council have too . . . I
spent the better part of a week exploring
whether we have wetlands ... Turns out that it
is not true ... Because I am an attorney, I have
looked at the legal issues too. I cannot hide as an
officer of the court and a lawyer from what I believe the truth is ... This project is before us on
one simple issue, a site plan review. A site plan
review allows us to look at whether that project
is within the zoning that is already been enacted
into law in the City of Cuyahoga Falls ... we are
not allowed to know if there is going to be 100
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kids there, 50 kids there, it is not pertinent to
the issue of whether that particular construction
project meets our zoning requirements. Our zoning requirements have nothing to do with
whether people drink, whether people smoke,
whether people shoot guns, whether people do
anything. We only have one thing to look at ... I
would hate like Hell to have to look you all in the
eyes and vote yes for this project. But, unless I
hear something to the contrary from the law department, I do not have any choice. I am being
honest with you and it breaks my heart, because
you are good people and you deserve consideration ... This has nothing to do with whether the
project is proper. This has to do with whether
these folks have the proper R-17 zoning. App.
144-47.
Councilwoman White explained that her motive in
trying to define Pleasant Meadows as a wetland was,
"[j]ust to get any legal shred that we could hang onto so
that we could reject this project." App. 150. The search for
such a pretext is by itself compelling evidence that the
underlying motive was improper. 23
In addition to searching for pretext, there were blatant attempts to conceal discriminatory motives. Residents
who participated in the April 9 meeting at North Hampton
Town Hall were warned not to disclose their lurking
biases. When some residents expressed concern about the
children who might live in Pleasant Meadows, they were
cautioned to avoid making discriminatory remarks. Tr.
293-95.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000).
23

23
Along with this wealth of direct evidence of discrimination, there is also significant circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory motives. The Pleasant Meadows development was proposed in an historically all-white City.
Census data showed that Cuyahoga Falls was only 1.06%
Mrican-American. Tr. 202-27. The City had a widespread
reputation in the region as a white enclave, as evidenced
by its nickname, "Caucasian Falls." Tr. 281, 317. There is
no sizable minority population in the City as a whole.
What scant minority population the City does have is
largely segregated from the white community. In stark
contrast to the almost non-existent Mrican-American
population in the City, the population of Summit County,
where Cuyahoga Falls is located, had a minority population of 11.8%. Tr. 224. The only sizeable concentration of
minorities in Cuyahoga Falls was the Honey Locust
Apartments on Prange Drive which was referred to with
hostility throughout the proceedings. Tr. 182-85, 270, 316;
App. 139, 191; JA 918-20.
Under the first Arlington Heights factor, "[t]he impact
of the official action whether it 'bears more heavily on one
race than another,'" cannot be disputed. 24 The Pleasant
Meadows development proposed by Buckeye was located
next to a condominium development. The condominiums,
like the rest of Cuyahoga Falls, were virtually all white.
Described as a "retirement community,'' there were presumably very few, if any, families with children residing in
that development. JA 479. Unlike the rest of the City and
the neighboring condominiums, the development proposed
by Buckeye was forecasted to have a substantial minority
24 Arlington Heights at 266, quoting, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976).
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population. Furthermore, all of the apartments were
designed as two and three bedroom units that would be
attractive to families with children. Tr. 30, 172-73. Uncontroverted expert testimony presented by Dr. Mark Salling,
Director of Northern Ohio Data and Information Service
(NODIS), established the extreme impact on the MricanAmerican community and on families with children if the
development were not built. Tr. 202-27; App. 271-90.
While Pleasant Meadows had 11 plus units per acre, a
few years earlier a 92-unit condominium development
with 15 plus units per acre was proposed for the same site
as the Buckeye development and approved by the City
without opposition. App. 43, 137; JA 148. The earlier
condominium project was not built only because the
developer went bankrupt. App. 43. Robart openly admitted
that "density [was] not the issue." JA 920.
A trier of fact could also conclude that City officials
were motivated by discriminatory purposes in treating the
referendum petition as valid. The Ohio Supreme Court
ultimately held the referendum, and thus the petition,
invalid. JA 58. This was an issue about which reasonable
attorneys might disagree, but a trier of fact could conclude
that the actions of the City officials were actually prompted,
not by a good faith legal error, but by discrimination. The
City argues that the City Engineer had no racial motive.
Even if the Engineer did not possess an improper motive,
the campaign to stop the development made him a mere
"eat's paw" of the blatantly biased officials.25
The referendum filing was accepted despite the City's
knowledge that the effects of the referendum would fall on

25

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
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groups protected under the Fair Housing Act. The filing
was accepted despite the fact that the City had discretion
under Ohio law to reject the referendum petition as
inappropriate. 26 A fact-finder could reasonably conclude
that, within the totality of the circumstances, the actions
taken by the City constituted purposeful discrimination.
There is no question that the actions taken by the City
delayed the building of the Pleasant Meadows development and had a severe impact on racial minorities and on
families with children. Construction was delayed for about
three years as a result of the maneuvering of the Mayor
and City officials in concert with private citizens. These
efforts to stop construction were thwarted only when the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the use of the referendum
process in this situation was unconstitutional under Ohio
law. The openly stated motives of the residents and City
officials in taking the actions are sufficient for a trier of
fact to find intentional discrimination against families
with children and African-Americans.
The record is riddled with officials' candid admissions
that they conjured a pretextual subterfuge in concert with
residents to deny Buckeye the site plan approval it had
every reasonable expectation to obtain. The St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks Court established that where:
[T]he factfinder dis belie[ves] the reasons put
forward by the defendant, together with the elements of the prima facie case, [that alone] may

26 State ex rel. Rhodes v. Bd. of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4 (1967)
(upholding refusal to put improper initiative petition on ballot); State ex
rel. Barberis v. Bay Village, 281 N.E.2d 209 (1971) (upheld a City
Council's refusal to certify a resolution for a referendum election on an
administrative action). And see, JA 1041-44.
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suffice to show intentional discrimination, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact
of intentional discrimination. Proof that the
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence
is simply one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination,
and it can be quite persuasive. 27
This case does not involve a spontaneous citizensponsored referendum where the City was a mere bystander: the referendum was the end product of a posse,
led by Mayor Robart. These actions go far beyond the few
comments made by residents against the Arlington
Heights development. They show a consistent and concerted effort by the Mayor, City officials, and residents,
guided by advice from the Law Director, to stop Pleasant
Meadows because of the race and familial status of its
potential residents.

C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
A city is not cloaked with immunity from liability for
violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights
merely because the violations are accomplished by way of
27 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134
(2000), quoting, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511
(1993). "In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose." See e.g., Wright v. West, 505
U.S. 277, 296 (1992). "Moreover, once the employer's justification has
been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put
forth the actual reason for its decision." Id. [emphasis added].
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a referendum. The City of Cuyahoga Falls could not
discriminate on the basis of race or familial status by way
of legislative or administrative decision-making without
being held accountable. That it did so by referendum does
not change the result. Given the overwhelming evidence of
City officials' discriminatory motives, this Court need not
reach any First Amendment issues.
1. VOTERS' RIGHTS WERE NOT CHILLED

BY A LAWSUIT AGAINST CITY OFFICIALS WHO VIOLATED EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
This is not a lawsuit against citizens for exercising
First Amendment rights. 28 This Court has uniformly held
that in considering whether official action is discriminatory, courts may evaluate statements made by members of
the public and statements of public officials or candidates
for office. 29

28
This case is thus distinguishable from White v. Lee, 227 F.3d
1214 (9th Cir. 2000), where the Court of Appeals held that the First
Amendment rights of community residents were chilled because of a
prolonged and invasive investigation conducted by HUD against the
residents for circulating a petition, organizing opposition to, and filing a
lawsuit against, a group home that was to be constructed in their
neighborhood. The action there was directly against the citizens.
29 White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (use of racial campaign tactics to defeat candidates supported by black voters); Arlington
Heights at 269 (statements of opponents of the development who spoke
at public meetings); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1 at 471 (statements made by
proponents of the amendment); Hunter at 229 (statements made by
delegates); Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 40, 45, 80 (1986) (appeals
to racial prejudice by white candidates relevant in proving claim under
the Voting Rights Act).

28

The argument was made in Wisconsin v. Mitchell that
a hate crime statute was unconstitutional because to prove
the crime, "the state would often have to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior speech, such as racial
epithets he may have uttered before the commission of the
offense. This evidentiary use of protected speech ... would
have a 'chilling effect' on those who feared the possibility
of prosecution for offenses subject to penalty enhancement."30 This Court rejected the argument as too speculative and held:
The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish
the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. 31
There is no special evidentiary protection for the
statements of legislators or voters in this case, nor is there
a chilling effect on speech, because this lawsuit did not
name the residents whose free speech rights are claimed
to have been chilled. The Solicitor General misapplied
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482 (1993).
I d. [emphasis added]. In support of its holding, this Court relied
on Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947) (holding that in a
trial for treason, the government could introduce evidence of conversations consisting of statements showing the defendant's sympathy with
Germany and Hitler and hostility toward the United States); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(allowing evidence of defendant's statements to evaluate his intent in
violating Title VII); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969)
("[N]othing in this opinion [which reversed a conviction for flag burning
because the defendant may have been punished for his speech] would
render the conviction impermissible merely because an element of the
crime was proved by the defendant's words rather than in some other
way.").
30
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Inc.; United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington; and,
BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B. when arguing that
this Court should require plaintiffs to show that the
referendum effort was a "sham." 32 The sham standard has
never been required in a case like this. The fact that the
defendants resorted to a referendum to defeat plaintiffs'
Equal Protection and Fair Housing rights does not give
their illegal actions First Amendment immunity. 33
The City, Mayor Robart, and the City Council cannot
claim a First Amendment right to commit discriminatory
acts in their official capacities that violate Equal Protection and the Fair Housing Act. Referenda that are used to
violate individual rights are illegal without additional

32 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); and, BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., _
U.S. _ , 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2395-96 (2002).
33 Because filing a lawsuit is a form of petitioning the government
protected under the First Amendment, this Court has held that the
lawsuit "must be a sham both objectively and subjectively" in order to
be deprived of First Amendment protection, BE & K at 2396 (action
filed under the National Labor Relations Act). The sham standard
developed in Noerr and Pennington involved direct claims against
individuals who filed lawsuits or who engaged in political activity. This
case does not seek liability for any referendum organizer or participant.
Railroad companies in Noerr were sued under the Clayton Act for
taking actions protected by the First Amendment to persuade the
legislature to pass laws that would destroy truckers as competitors for
long-distance freight business. To permit the lawsuit would have
directly penalized the railroads for exercising their First Amendment
rights. Similarly, in Pennington it was alleged that a union tried to
influence the Secretary of Labor to set minimum wage laws to drive
small operators out of business. Again, this was a direct action under
the antitrust laws against a union for exercising its First Amendment
rights.
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proof that they were a "sham." 34 Indeed, in every land
situation, some "rational reason," i.e., density, could
always be articulated to defeat a finding that the referendum was a "sham." Whether a governmental action is
accomplished by regular legislative process or by referendum is immaterial if it violates rights protected under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 35

2. A REFERENDUM CANNOT BE USED TO
CARRY OUT ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION
Referenda that violate the United States Constitution
are illegal. In Hunter v. Erickson, this Court invalidated
under Equal Protection an ordinance adopted by the
voters in Akron, Ohio. 36 The law provided that any ordinance regulating the use, sale, advertisement, transfer,
listing, lease, or financing of real property on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry must first
be approved by a majority of the voters. This Court stated,
34 See, Lukas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969);
Washington v. Seattle School Dist, supra n.22; and, Romer u. Evans, 517
u.s. 620 (1996).
35 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (election system); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment test); Arlington Heights
(zoning variance); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)
(dual system of education); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229
(1985) (voting restrictions); and see, Lukas at 736. Absolute or qualified
immunity is a sufficient defense to protect public officials in an action
for damages for their illegal acts. It is unclear if the Solicitor General is
arguing that the "sham defense" would be available only in actions for
damages or might apply even in actions for injunction or declaratory
relief, which would allow a municipality to eviscerate the rights of a
citizen in Buckeye's position.
36 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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"[t]he sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those
constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted
and remain unrepealed." 37
Initiatives and referenda cannot be used as instruments of discrimination. Individual rights cannot be
eviscerated by a majority vote, nor may officials immunize
their illegal acts by having them ratified by a majority
vote of the electorate. 38 "One's right to life, liberty, and
property . . . and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 39

II.

RESPONDENTS ARE WITHDRAWING THE DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM

Respondents have consistently presented and will
continue to rely on statistical evidence of discriminatory
effects to prove the City's intent to discriminate. While
Respondents successfully argued below that such evidence
supported a separate claim under the disparate impact
theory, Respondents are explicitly withdrawing and
abandoning their disparate impact claim in this litigation.40
Id. at 392.
Lukas at 736.
39 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
40 Even if Respondents were to pursue a separate disparate impact
claim, the City's second question would not be presented by the facts of
this case. First, Respondents have never contended that the mere filing
of the referendum caused the harm alleged. Instead, it was the delay in
the construction of the housing that caused the legal injury. Second, the
City's characterization of the referendum as ''judicially upheld" is
misleading, since ultimately the referendum was not upheld.
37
38
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III. THE REFERENDUM VIOLATED THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states and municipalities from depriving individuals of "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." 41 The Due Process Clause has a fundamental role in the land use context and in this case. 42 This is
not disputed by the City. 43
The evidence in the record demonstrates that the City
violated Buckeye's lawful right to use of its property. 44
Contrary to the contentions of the City, Buckeye had a
protected property interest both through its ownership of
the land in question and because of its legitimate expectations in the benefits of the site plan approval, based on the
City's zoning code and its approval of the site plan.
The City's actions in stopping the development were
arbitrary and capricious. The use of a referendum to
decide what was a purely administrative matter was a
decidedly unfair process, permitting a group of citizens to
gang up on Buckeye for reasons not related to the established legal requirements that had mandated the City's
Planning Commission and Council to approve the site
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV
James Madison, NOTE TO HIS SPEECH ON THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE, in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 450 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) ("In civilized communities, property as well as
personal rights is an essential object of the laws ... the rights both of
property [and] ... of persons ought to be effectually guarded.").
43
Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, pp. 27-28.
44 The other party, FHCS, did not raise any due process claim in
the complaint.
41
42

33
plan. Because it provided for and acted upon an illegal
referendum process which resulted in a multi-year delay of
Buckeye's approved development, the City can be held
liable for a violation of substantive due process.

A. BUCKEYE POSSESSED A PROPERTY INTEREST
This Court has never determined what is necessary to
constitute a property right protected by the Due Process
Clause in a land-use context. The Second and Fourth
Circuits will find a constitutionally protected property
interest only where a strict entitlement test is met. 45
The entitlement test is based on the analysis in Board
of Regents v. Roth. 46 Roth requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to a benefit in
order to establish a constitutionally protected property
interest, and requires the legitimacy of such a claim to be
demonstrated by reference to state laws or other understandings independent of the Constitution.
An alternative to the strict entitlement view is found
in certain decisions from the Third, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits. These decisions have taken a more protective
view of property rights. In DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment, the court rejected a zoning board's argument
that a landowner must demonstrate a "legitimate claim of

45 Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995);
Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63,68 (4th
Cir. 1992).
•• Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property
interests ... are not created by the Constitution ....").
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entitlement" to a zoning variance denied by the government.47 Instead, the Third Circuit held that the ownership
of land, by itself, is a property interest worthy of constitutional protection from arbitrary zoning decisions. 48 As the
DeBlasio court explained," ... one would be hard-pressed
to find a property interest more worthy of substantive due
process protection than ownership." 49
The Sixth Circuit has wrestled with this issue. In
Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, the court stated, "this
circuit has implicitly recognized that mere ownership of
property subjected to zoning is a property interest sufficient to invoke due process." 50
The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue several
times, though not always very directly: "[b]ecause the
property interest in such a case is apparent - it is the
ownership interest in the land itself- the interest is often
assumed without discussion." 51
The most cogent explanation of the historical context
for the constitutional protection of real property was given

DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600-01 (3rd
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 937 (1995).
48 Id.
47

Id. at 601.
Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1218 n.29 (6th
Cir. 1992). Subsequently, however, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit
held that "before [a plaintiff] can establish a violation of substantive
due process, he must demonstrate that he had a property interest in the
use of the undeveloped parcel as a condominium complex." Silver v.
Franklin Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir.
1992). See also, Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198,
202 (6th Cir. 1995).
51
Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1989).
49

50
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m River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park. 52 Judge
Easterbrook explained that reference to property in the
U.S. Constitution reflects its Lockean heritage. 53 Without
such protection, Judge Easterbrook pointed out, the
government could say, ominously, "we may put your land
in any zone we want, for any reason we feel like [and thus]
abolish all property rights in land overnight." 54
The circuits are clearly split on this issue.55 This Court
can alleviate the confusion by affirming that the "right of
[a landowner] to devote [his] land to any legitimate use is
properly within the protection of the Constitution." 56 The
Court should recognize that ownership of land by itself
entitles the landowner to freedom from arbitrary or
irrational interference with the use of that land. 57 Such an
approach values property rights highly and should replace

52

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164 (7th Cir.

1994).

Id. at 165-66. See also, Amicus Curiae Brief of Pacific Legal
Foundation and Center for Equal Opportunity, pp. 23-29.
54 River Park at 166.
55 An excellent review of the conflict in the circuits on this issue is
found in Daniel R. Mandelker, Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A
Festschrift in Honor of Daniel R. Mandelker: Part II: Discussions on the
National Level: Chapter 2: Property Rights: Entitlement to Substantive
Due Process: Old versus New Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH.
U. J.L. & PoL'y 61 (2000).
56 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.
116, 121 (1928).
57 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917). "Property," Justice
Day wrote, "is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is
elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.
The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property."
58
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the strict entitlement test, which can leave arbitrary
governmental land use decisions unexamined. 58
Buckeye can meet either standard for establishing a
property interest. Obviously it can show ownership of the
real property in question. And, contrary to assertions
within the Petitioners' Brief, Buckeye can show a "legitimate claim of entitlement," sufficient to demonstrate
justifiable expectations of receiving the benefits of the
approved site plan and receiving building permits. 59
Under Ohio law, it is clear that a landowner who
submits a plan for development of the land that complies
with the applicable zoning and planning laws and regulations has a legitimate entitlement to proceed with that
plan. Ohio law regarding the vesting of rights in the use of
real property is found in the case of Gibson u. Oberlin. 60
The Supreme Court of Ohio held in Gibson that, "where
... a property owner has complied with all the legislative
requirements for the procurement of a building permit and
his proposed structure falls within the use classification of
the area in which he proposes to build it, he has a right to
such permit, and there is a duty on the part of the officer
charged therewith to issue it. " 61
58 "The Fourteenth Amendment, if nothing else, was aimed at
protecting the rights of individuals against states. If the state can so
facilely and conclusively define those rights out of existence, the
Fourteenth Amendment becomes, to a great extent, a dead letter.... "
Greene v. McGuire, 683 F.2d 32, 37 (2nd Cir. 1982) (Oakes, J., concurring).
59 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, pp. 29-31.
60 Gibson v. Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1 (1960).
61 Gibson at 5-6 (1960) [emphasis added]. And see, Nunamaker v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2 Ohio St. 3d 115 (1982); State ex rel. Fairmount
(Continued on following page)
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Since the property was already zoned for multi-family
housing and the site plan met all the requirements of the
City ordinances, Buckeye had an absolute right to approval of the plans as submitted. 62 That Buckeye's site
plan met all the legal requirements of the City's zoning
code is not disputed. Planning Director Sharpe testified
that the site plan met "all the necessary requirements set
forth that had to be considered for approval." 63 Councilwoman Hummel considered that after getting the site
plan, obtaining a building permit in Cuyahoga Falls was
not difficult. "When you meet all the requirements to build
a building, they will be approved. There is not a basis on
which to turn them down. They are not going to submit
something that is not acceptable building standards." 64
Buckeye met all the legal requirements and it possessed
an entitlement that is constitutionally protected.
Buckeye had every reason to expect that in purchasing property zoned for its intended purpose, and in creating at considerable expense a conforming site plan that
was then approved by the Planning Commission and
eventually by Council, it would be able to proceed and
enjoy the benefits of the site plan approval, be issued the
necessary building permits, and construct the planned
Ctr. Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259 (1941); State ex rel. Ice & Fuel Co. v.
Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 354 (1929); In reAppeal of Clements, 2
Ohio App. 2d 201 (1965).
62 See, Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. W. J. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118,
122 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Township's approval of development plan required
when developer complies with all objective criteria for a subdivision).
63 Tr. 139-40.
64 App. 165. And see, Report of Professor Allen Fonoroff, App. 10309.
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housing development. Thus, Buckeye had a cognizable
property interest created by the City's zoning ordinance,
and as such, a constitutionally protected property right.

B. THE CITY'S ACTIONS VIOLATED SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
As Buckeye held a protected property interest, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from arbitrary or irrational
governmental actions that infringe upon that interest. 65 As
this Court has stated, due process "demands . . . that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the objective sought to be obtained." 66 Therefore, substantive due process rights protect property
owners from any irrational or arbitrary interference with
their property rights, including arbitrary or irrational
interference with processing a land-use permit.
Petitioner argues that Buckeye had an adequate
remedy under state law.67 The requirement that a plaintiff
prove the lack of an adequate remedy under state law
comes from procedural due process cases in which a
deprivation of liberty or property without prior notice or
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980),
quoting, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
67 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, p. 28. Petitioners never raised
this issue in the District Court, the Court of Appeals or in the Petition
for Certiorari. Thus, the argument should be disregarded by this Court.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 319 n.3, 321 (1999), and, DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989).
65
66
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opportunity to be heard is challenged. 68 That doctrine has
no application to a substantive due process claim because
"the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component
that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.' " 69 Thus, regardless of the availability of
state remedies, Buckeye's substantive due process claim
can be addressed.
1. A REFERENDUM ON QUASI-JUDICIAL

OR ADMINISTRATIVE LAND USE DECISIONS IS A PER SE SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
The right of the people to the use of direct democracy
is not absolute. 70 Under our form of government the federal
judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and property, not
only from the government, but from arbitrary and unlawful acts of the majority. As James Madison recognized:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies,
there is the danger of oppression. In our Government the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,
See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990), quoting, Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327,331 (1986).
70 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 n.4 (1971). An excellent
discussion on the balancing and tension between the right of participatory democracy and private property rights is found in Hans A Linde,
When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not Republican Government? 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 161 (1989).
68
69

40
but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the
Constituents. 71
The City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
Court recognized that "as a basic instrument of democratic
government, the referendum process does not, in itself,
violate the Due Process Clause . . . when applied to a
rezoning ordinance." 72 However, Eastlake held that voters
can be empowered to act as legislators provided that the
action they are empowered to take is legislative. 73 Eastlake
was a rezoning case and thus the referendum there was on
a legislative matter. The City's decision to approve Buckeye's site plan, however, was purely administrative. 74
A zoning law, unlike an administrative or judicial
decision on a site plan, applies directly to a whole class of
people. The smaller the class affected by a nominally
legislative act, the greater the danger of the denigration of
the class members' rights. The class here is one - Buckeye.
Buckeye was the only developer ever to face a site plan
referendum in over thirty years that the City Charter had
such a provision.
The City Charter that is challenged in this case did
not authorize the voters to determine, in the manner of
zoning, whether a particular parcel or entire area should
be used for a specific purpose or use such as the situation
71 Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 391 (1967) (Douglas J.,
concurring), quoting, 5 Writings of James Madison, 272 (Hunted. 1904).
72 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679
(1976) [emphasis added].

Id. at 674 n.9.
Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls,
82 Ohio St. 3d 539 (1998).
73
74
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in Eastlake. Instead, it authorized voters, with the City's
imprimatur, to act as a Super Planning Commission or
court to decide if a site plan they had never seen conformed to a zoning code they had never read.
In a typical zoning or rezoning case, prospective uses
of property are at issue, and decision-making is likely to be
based on general, legislative grounds. 75 Voters are likely to
consider whether they want a building "like that" in their
neighborhood. As was the case in Cuyahoga Falls, a
targeted site plan referendum calls on the voters to decide
whether very technical documents and plans meet the
existing laws already approved by their City's zoning code,
which permits a building "like that" in their neighborhood. 76 However, such an evaluation on the conformity to
75 As Justice Holmes pointed out, writing for the Court in Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1908) (citations omitted),
"Ajudicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to
exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks
to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to
be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power."
76 It is this distinction between Eastlake and the facts of the
Buckeye litigation which requires the opposite result. As Chief Justice
Burger explained:
The situation presented in this case is not one of a zoning
action denigrating the use or depreciating the value of land;
instead, it involves an effort to change a reasonable zoning
restriction. No existing rights are being impaired; new use
rights are being sought from the City Council. Thus, this
case involves an owner's seeking approval of a new use free
from the restrictions attached to the land when it was acquired.
Eastlake at 678-79 n.13. The situation that the Eastlake Court said was
not presented then is presented here: the Cuyahoga Falls referendum
did impair existing rights.
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legal requirements is in the domain of an agency or for the
adjudication of a judge. 77 In a recent case from the Seventh
Circuit, Chief Judge Posner recognized that such decisions
should not be left to the voters: "[s]o the issue 'is not too
much delegation, but delegation to the wrong body: delegation of an administrative or judicial decision-making, for
example, to people who are not administrators or
judges.' " 78 By adopting such a per se rule this Court can
alleviate the confusion, at least involving cases of referenda on land use issues, setting forth a standard that will
carefully balance the values of democracy and property
rights.

2. THE SITE PLAN REFERENDUM VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
BECAUSE IT DELEGATES TO VOTERS
THE POWER TO PROHffiiT A LAWFUL
USE OF BUCKEYE'S LAND
Should the Court decline to adopt a per se rule that
prohibits referenda on administrative/judicial decisions on
land use issues, there is an alternative rule that can be
found in a trio of this Court's early land use decisions. In
The Arizona Supreme Court has used this principle in holding
that zoning by initiative poses an irreconcilable conflict with the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Transamerica Title
Ins. Co. Trust v. City of Tucson, 157 Ariz. 346 (1988); City of Scottsdale
v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204 (1968). And see, the following state
supreme court cases: Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574,
580-81 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 298-299
(1972); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, Colo., 189 Colo. 421,423-24 (1975).
78 Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting,
United Beverage Co. of South Bend, Inc. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n, 760 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1985).
77
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Eubank v. City of Richmond and Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge the Court struck down ordinances that delegated
legislative power over land use decisions to neighboring
landowners. 79 In both Eubank and Roberge, this Court
pointed out that the offending provision conferred the
power on some property holders to virtually control and
dispose of the property rights of others, but created no
standard by which the granted power was to be exercised.
In between those two decisions, the Court was faced
with a somewhat similar factual situation, but came to the
opposite result. In Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, an
ordinance prohibited the erection of billboards in designated blocks, but allowed this prohibition to be modified
with the consent of those who were to be most affected by
the modification. 80 The ordinance in Eubank allowed
property owners to impose restrictions on another property, while in Cusack, the ordinance permitted one-half of
the property owners to remove a restriction from other
property owners. The ordinance in Cusack was upheld.
Thus, in these decisions, the Court has instructed that
in order for a delegation of governmental authority to
private citizens to survive a due process challenge, two
criteria must be satisfied: "First, the underlying exercise of
authority must be a reasonable regulation within the
power of the government. Second, the legislature's restriction must be in the form of a general prohibition, and the

Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), and, Seattle
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
BD Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
79
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delegation must be in the form of permitting private
citizens to waive the protection of that prohibition. " 81
Applying these criteria, the Charter's grant of referendum rights on "any ordinance or resolution passed by
Council" violates substantive due process. 82 The Charter
does meet the first part of Cusack's two-part standard. It
cannot be disputed that the requirement of a site plan
approval is a reasonable regulation within the power of
the government. However, the Charter provision allowing
the disputed referendum fails to meet the second part of
the test.
The City's zoning code, which permits development
within its guidelines, cannot be thought of as a general
prohibition. The City, by enacting its general land use
plan, approved the development of apartments on the
particular property owned by Buckeye. Moreover, the
charter referendum provision did not provide for citizens
to waive restrictions to permit development. Instead,
much like the delegations to citizens struck down in
Eubank and Roberge, the Cuyahoga Falls referendum
allowed voters to prevent development and impose an
absolute restriction on the proposed land use plans.
Therefore, the City's referendum on Buckeye's site plan,
lacking all standards to guide the decision of the voters,
permitted the police power to be exercised in a standardless, and hence, arbitrary and capricious manner m
violation of this Court's Eubank and Roberge decisions.
81 Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1988), citing,
Cusack at 528, but see, Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88 (1st
Cir. 1981).
82 App. at 14.
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3. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF BUCKEYE'S
SITE PLAN WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND A DENIAL OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
If this Court decides not to adopt a more uniform

standard regarding land use referenda, it should still
affirm the Sixth Circuit opinion based upon existing
precedent holding that the essential purpose of due process is "to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government." 83 In determining whether
governmental conduct reaches the threshold of being so
arbitrary or irrational as to violate the Substantive Due
Process Clause, courts are to view the totality of the
circumstances in which the governmental action occurred.84 This case-by-case analysis has been traditionally
utilized by Courts of Appeals in land use cases. 85
A review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the denial of Buckeye's site plan for the Pleasant
Meadows development, especially when considered in the
light that all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the
non-movant, supports the conclusion that the Sixth
Circuit's opinion requiring a trial on Buckeye's substantive
due process claim is correct. The facts show that Buckeye's

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1998).
85 See, e.g., Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 26768 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding township officers' obstruction of building
permit process for reasons unrelated to merits of permit application
sufficient to state a substantive due process claim); Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1508-09 (9th Cir.
1990).
83

84
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property interest was arbitrarily and capriciously denied
by the City.
Buckeye reasonably expected that in purchasing
property that was zoned for its intended purpose and in
working up, at considerable expense, a site plan that was
then approved by the City, it would be issued the necessary building permits and would construct the planned
housing development. To be denied the building permits
because of the City's own illegal referendum process is
precisely the sort of "arbitrary and capricious" action that
has been found to violate the right to due process. 86
Moreover, there are particular factual circumstances
illustrating the arbitrary nature of the City's interference
with Buckeye's use of its property. For instance, the fact
that Mayor Robart assured Buckeye that it would have "no
problem" building a tax credit development on the Pleasant Meadows site. JA 1380-82. Relying on that assurance
and the existing zoning code, Buckeye paid a premium
price for the property. JA 724, 728-30. Another special
circumstance is the nature of the tax credit program and
the effect of a failure to build a project for which tax
credits were granted within the program's strict time
limits. Under the program, a developer who fails to complete a development on time not only loses the credit for
that project but is also barred from applying for grants to
support other tax credit developments in the future. Tr.
50-51; R. 193-94. City officials were aware of the time
pressures on Buckeye. App. 157, 763; JA 943.

86 Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710 (6th Cir.
1991); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Evidence that the challenged decision was due at least
in part to an improper or illegal motive is indicative - in
fact, it can even be dispositive - that the decision was not
made on a rational basis. 87 As detailed above, there is
ample evidence that the referendum and the denial of the
site plan were based on the race and familial status of the
expected population of Pleasant Meadows. For instance,
there were comments and statements inferring that
problems would beset the community because of the race
of expected residents; statements by the Mayor suggesting
that the City would outlast Buckeye in litigation; evidence
that members of Council were desperately seeking some
pretext upon which to base the site plan denial; as well as
the peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the denial
of the building permits after the site plan had been approved by Council, including unprecedented orders issued
before the certification of the referendum petitions.
It is uncontested that Buckeye's development plan
met all the zoning requirements. The referendum was
87 Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667,683
(3d Cir. 1991) ("Thus, allegations that the government's actions in a
particular case were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive,
such as partisan political reasons or personal reasons unrelated to the
merits of the plaintiffs' application, may support a finding of substantive due process violation."), citing, Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129
(3d Cir. 1988); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir.
1989) (City Council's deliberations tainted by impermissible religious
considerations); Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir.
1995) (an improper motive on behalf of a town in revoking the permit
was violative of substantive due process); Creative Environments, Inc. v.
Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989
(1982) (government's action may violate substantive due process if
"fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus, or the like" is
shown).
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based on public animus towards the future residents of the
development, and not at all on the technical requirements
of the plan, which had been approved by the Planning
Commission and City Council. Thus, the City did not have
a legitimate interest in preventing the construction of the
apartment complex. 88 Allowing the voters of the City to
overturn a site plan approval which would be mandated
under the existing zoning code was in itself an arbitrary
and capricious restriction on Buckeye's use of its property.
The character of the denial is even more obvious when the
evidence of the racial and anti-children motives of City
officials and petition drive organizers is taken into account.
The City maintains that it had no choice in taking the
actions about which Buckeye complains because it just
"followed its charter and state law" and further states that
it "took the only action available to it and continued to
honor the preemptive effect of the referendum on its
ability to issue permits." 89 The City asks this Court to
absolve it from any responsibility as if the source of the
law that the City followed was imposed upon the City by
another authority.
Buckeye urges the Court to reject this "devil-mademe-do-it" defense, in that the law the City points to as
providing a rational basis for its actions is its own law.
The City promulgated its own charter that provided for an
88 In a remarkably analogous case, a city decided to prevent the
building of an apartment complex because a referendum had indicated
overwhelming resistance. Wheeler u. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99
(5th Cir. 1981) (public outcry against a project does not evince a
legitimate state interest to prevent such a development).
89 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, pp. 31-32.
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unlawful referendum on an administrative matter, and the
City itself acted illegally pursuant to that charter. 90 The
City now seeks a ruling by this Court that would allow a
municipality to deprive citizens of fundamental property
or liberty rights simply because the municipality has
passed an ordinance or a charter provision permitting that
deprivation.
While this Court has shown due deference to the
people's right to legislate directly, it has also struck down
such conduct when it violates the U.S. Constitution. As
this Court explained, " ... if the substantive result of the
referendum is arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to the police power, then the fact that the voters of
Eastlake wish it so would not save the restriction." 91
Referenda that violate minorities' constitutional rights are
not sacrosanct. 92 The decision of the Court of Appeals
holding that there are genuine issues of fact that would
permit a finding that the City's actions were arbitrary and
capricious and constituted a substantive due process
violation should be affirmed

The City argues in its brief that the referendum process was
perfectly legal until the Ohio Supreme Court ruled it otherwise. This
ignores Ohio law on the retroactive effect of case decisions. As explained
in Zagorski v. South Euclid-Lyndhurst Bd. of Edn., once overruled,
Ohio case law is as if it never existed. Zagorski v. South EuclidLyndhurst Bd. of Edn., 15 Ohio St. 3d 10, 12 (1984).
91
Eastlake at 676.
92 See, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 391 (1967); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, supra n.22; Romer, supra n.34.
90
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals, holding that there are genuine issues of fact that
the Petitioners' actions discriminated on the basis of race
and familial status in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act, and that the City's actions
were arbitrary and capricious, and constituted a substantive due process violation.
Respectfully submitted,
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